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Abstract 
The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia designed a state system on the twin-principle of territoriality and sovereignty. 
Sovereignty accords the state unquestionable but legitimate control over the nation and polity, and gives it the 
latitude to preserve and protect its territorial domain from both internal and external threats. However, aside the 
fact that globalisation and the internationalisation of the globe have reduced the primacy of these dual 
principles, there have also been the problem of ideological and terrorist networks that have taken advantage of 
the instruments of globalization to emerge and threaten state sovereignty and its preservation. The security and 
sovereignty of the Nigerian State have been under threat as a result of the emergence and activities of insurgent 
groups, such as Boko Haram in the Northeast and other militant groups in other parts of the country. Using a 
descriptive-analytical approach, this paper examines the security challenges Nigeria faces from insurgency and 
the impact of this on national peace, security and sovereignty. The study shows that the frequency of insurgent 
attacks has resulted in collateral damage on the peace, stability, development and sovereignty of the state. It 
finds also that the federal government has not been decisive enough. These place urgent and decisive demand on 
the government to adopt new management strategy that will address and contain the insurgent and terrorist 
groups. It is recommended that government at all levels should awake to its responsibilities, ensure adequate 
funding and training of the security agencies, as well as fortification of the armed forces with sophisticated 
weapons that will effectively outmatch the firepower of the terrorists’; and tightening of the borders to checking 
of the influx of people into its territory.  
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Introduction 
The return to democracy in Nigeria in May, 1999 brought hopes of development and political 
stability to Nigeria. The last decade in Nigeria has experienced an increase in violent 
conflicts and criminality, which tended to undermine those expectations. The violence and 
criminality have come in the form of armed robbery, kidnapping, drug trafficking, arms 
smuggling, human trafficking and militancy, among other acts of criminality that undermine 
national security. Internal security has been significantly undercut by violent activities of 
civilian-in-arms against the Nigerian State. These have included radicalized religious and 
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regional youth groups, prominent among which are the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND), O’Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), the Arewa People’s Congress 
(APC), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign 
State of Biafra (MASSOB), and more recently, Boko Haram, Ansaru, ‘Kala-Kato’, and 
Ombatse, among others (Onuoha, 2012: 134-151).   
The rise of these groups has had significant influence on the numbers of ethnic and religious 
conflicts Nigeria has witnessed. The exact number of ethno-religious conflicts that have 
occurred in the country is not known due to lack of adequate statistics and records on this 
subject-matter. However, Onuoha (2012:134-151) has averred that about 40% of ethno-
religious crisis has occurred in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. There has particularly been an 
increase between 2012 and 2014 in the occurrences of terrorist attacks in the country with 
government’s insignificant success in curbing the menace. By this, the focus and scope of the 
discourse in this paper therefore, give the discourse contemporary relevance. It is against this 
background that the paper explores the phenomenon of terrorism/insurgency in Nigeria, its 
adverse impact on nationhood and security, and recommends new management strategies that 
the Nigerian government can make use of in tackling the problem. 
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis  
In this section, concepts central to the discourse, such as insurgency, terrorism, security and 
the state are briefly discussed. 
i. Insurgency 
Insurgency is an ambiguous concept. The United States Department of Defence (2007) 
defines it as organized movement that has the aim of overthrowing a constituted government 
through subversive means and armed conflict (Cited in Hellesen, 2008:14). This definition 
suggests that insurgent groups employ unlawful means towards achieving an end, which 
could be political, religious, social or even ideological. The goal of insurgency is to confront 
and overthrow an existing government for the control of power, resources or for power 
sharing (Siegel, 2007:328). 
ii. Terrorism 
According to Ekaterina (2008), terrorism is a sort of violence that uses one-sided violent 
approach against civilians. It also engages uneven violent confrontation against a stronger 
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adversary, which could be a state or a group of states. Chomsky (2001:19) defines terrorism 
as “the use of coercive means aimed at populations in an effort to achieve political, religious 
or even other aims”. The US State Department defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (cited in Isyaku, 2013: 17-18). 
The United Nations (1992) defines terrorism as “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated 
violent action, employed by semi- clandestine individual, group or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct 
targets of violence are not the main targets” (Cited in Siegel, 2007:385). 
For Lesser (1999:6), international terrorism can be referred to as an act in which terrorists 
cross national borders to perpetrate attacks within the territory of other states. The targets of 
attacks could be embassies, individuals, schools, government parastatals, security institutions, 
international organisations, et cetera. Terrorists could also hijack ships on the high sea and 
planes in the air. Therefore, terrorism is an act that aims at achieving social, political, 
religious, economic and even psychological goals through the use of coercive and 
intimidating acts outside the context of legitimate warfare activities that conveys some forms 
of messages to an audience.    
iii. Security 
According to Francis (2005: 22), security is a state of being safe and the absence of fear, 
anxiety, danger, poverty and oppression. It is the preservation of core values and the absence 
of threats to these values (Cited in Alli, 2010:73). Imobighe (1990:224) opines that security is 
the freedom from threats to a nation’s capability to defend and develop itself, promote its 
values and lawful interest. For Zabadi (2005:3), security is a state in which people or things 
are not exposed to danger of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or decline. This 
view is associated with the survival of the state and the preservation of its citizens. In other 
words, the state has the responsibility of the use of force and power for the safety of its 
territory and its people.  
Furthermore, there is the crucial need to define national security. Held (1998:226) gives a 
traditional meaning of national security. He describes national security as “the acquisition, 
deployment and use of military force to achieve national goals”. Romm (1993) describes it as 
the lack of danger or risk to held standards, values and ideals and the absence of fear that 
such values will be attacked now or in the future. Thus, national security is the preservation 
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of the values a nation holds as relates to the defence of it territory from human as well as non-
human threats and guides in the pursuit of it national interest in the international system.  
iv. State  
The term state is derived from the Italian word “lo stato”, a term coined by Niccolo 
Machiavelli to depict the social order that oversees and rules over a political entity or a 
country. According to Ekanem (2001:55) the “state is a permanent specialized organization 
of men armed with rules and means of coercion for maintaining order over a population in a 
defined territory over which this organization exercises power.” For Max Weber, the state is 
an essential political union that has a centralized government that maintains a monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force within a certain territory (Cited in Shaw, 2003). Evident in these 
definitions are the characteristics of the state such as territorial authority, sovereignty, 
government, population, independence, the right to relate with other states and very 
importantly, the monopoly of use of instruments of force. 
The Character and Identity of the Nigerian State 
Nigeria is a union of separate ethno-cultural units that occupied land terrains that were former 
British colonies. The Nigerian State is pluralistic in nature, that is, it is a multi-ethnic state or 
nation-state with over 300 groups, of diverse ethnic and religious identity. Every group is 
dissimilar to another based on the uniqueness of cultures, languages, religions and value 
systems (Ojo, 2006: 368-378; Aluko, 1998: 78-84). These differences amongst the various 
social groupings have remained a major determinant of social relationships.  
It is worthy of note to state that social relations between and amongst the various groups have 
been characterised by cooperation, aggression, discrimination, conflicts, mistrust and 
prejudice. Even though Nigeria’s motto is unity in diversity, yet from the beginning, the 
country has not been able to successfully accommodate the interest of all the divergent 
groups within its territory. There have been various insurgencies, rebellions and public 
revolts that seem to have been entrenched in the multicultural nature of the Nigerian State. 
Examples of public uprisings include the Tiv-Jukun/Fulani Conflict (2003), Gwantu crisis 
(2001), political violence and unrest in Yorubaland in western Nigeria between 1960 and 
1966, the Nigerian Civil War, the census crisis, the post presidential election crisis of 2011, 
the Maitatsine uprising in Kano in the 1980s, and the Yan Tatsine riots in the early 1980s. 
Other theatres of conflict included, Zango Kataf in Kaduna State in 1992, Zaria Shiites 
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outbreak, Jos Mayhem, Kaduna religious riots, Maiduguri onslaughts, Kano violence of 1953, 
ethno-religious massacre in Kano, Kaduna and Plateau in the wake of sharia judicial system, 
Nupe –Yoruba conflict in Kwara and the Boko Haram insurgency (Badru, 1998:4, cited in 
Tijani, 2010:187-220; Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, 2009: 7-14).  
Insurgency and National Security Challenges in Nigeria  
As earlier mentioned, the phenomenon of ethnicity and religious intolerance have led to 
incessant recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts, which have birthed copious ethnic militias 
like the Bakassi Boys, O'dua People Congress (OPC), the Egbesu Boys; the Ijaw Youth. 
Congress (IYC); the Arewa People’s Congress (APC), the Igbo People Congress (IPC) and 
the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), amongst 
others (Salawu, 2010:345-353). The surfacing of these militia groups has made religious 
intolerance and fanaticism more violent and disturbing. The two most notorious terrorist 
groups that have challenged Nigeria’s national security, territoriality, sovereignty and unity 
have been the Niger Delta militant group and Boko Haram. 
a. Insurgency in the Niger Delta  
The long years of abandonment, environmental degradation, coupled with the 
inconsiderateness of successive governments and exploitation by the oil companies, produced 
a capricious atmosphere in the 1990s, characterized by frustration, anger and aggression that 
manifested in constitutional and violent protests and conflicts in the region (Folarin and 
Okodua, 2010). According to Azigbo (2008:18), the agitation actually began as peaceful 
protests by community development committees of a range of host communities to 
multinational oil companies. Peaceful protests however degenerated into forceful agitations 
when the requests of the groups as regards the development of the region were slow in 
coming. The agitations were heightened by the massacre of the nine Ogoni leaders and Ken 
Saro-Wiwa in 1995 by the military dictatorship of General Sani Abacha, who had ignored all 
international and local entreaties and appeals to commute the death sentence of the 
environmentalists. By 1998, anarchy overwhelmed most of the Niger Delta region (Folarin, 
2007). 
Well-known among the belligerent groups operational in the area were the Niger Delta 
Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah, the Martyrs Brigade, the Niger 
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Delta Vigilante force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom, the Bush Boys, among others (Duru, 
2012:162-170). The underlying issues of contention by the armed militant groups were the 
greater control of the oil resources in the Niger Delta region by the people, fair allocation of 
the revenue from oil exploitation, ending the oil spills and gas flaring, compensation for the 
decades of ecocide, as well as the physical and infrastructural development of the region. 
However, the Nigerian government saw their protests as acts of sabotage to the revenue 
generation of the nation (Cyril, 2008).  
Aside the basic problems outlined above, other causes of militancy in the region included 
marginalization, abject poverty, massive unemployment, destruction of aquatic ecosystem, 
the alteration of the soil quality, air pollution, and socio-economic disorganization 
(Nwogwugwu, Alao and Egwuonwu, 2012: 23-37). 
The activities of the groups in the Niger Delta manifested in diverse ways such as militancy, 
kidnapping, killings, bombing, hostage taking, demolition of oil and gas facilities, pipeline 
vandalisation, illegal oil bunkering (Duru, 2012: 162-170). The militants launched attacks on 
the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), Chevron and TotalFinal Elf (IFE) 
staff and facilities. MEND killed oil workers at Chevron, TotalFina Elf (IFE), damaged a 
rescue helicopter sent to rescue employees, killed naval officers, injured soldiers, attacked 
police stations like the Mini-Okoro Elenlewo and killed some officers on duty, attacked five-
star hotels, and carried out a bomb attack on the Eagle Square, Abuja on October 1, 2010 
during the fifty year anniversary of independence. Between 1999 and 2007 a total of 308 
hostage incidents were recorded in the region (Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe, 2013: 46-60).  
The sophistication of the weapons plus the dexterousness of operation questioned the security 
of the Nigerian State. Despite the seeming prevailing calmness of the region at the moment, 
as regards the issues of terrorism, the outstanding issues of resource control and allocation, 
poverty alleviation and environmental security remain potential sources of explosive 
situations. Incidentally, while the amnesty for, and rehabilitation of the Niger Delta militants 
were beginning to mitigate the situation in the country, the Boko Haram uprising began.  
b. The Boko Haram Challenge  
The Boko Haram issue started as an insignificant agitation of an Islamic sect with a strange 
commitment to non-conformist standards of social organization in Muslim-dominated Bauchi 
and Borno states. It began in Bauchi State on July 26, 2009 and since that time, the group has 
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extended its activities to other Northern states as well as to other parts of Nigeria. Unlike the 
militants in the Niger Delta that were driven by purely economic goals, Boko Haram is driven 
by proclivity in religious conviction, political aspirations and social practice. Specifically, its 
ultimate goal is to make Nigeria an Islamic State and uphold only the laws of as set out in the 
Koran (Walker, 2012). This group believes Islam detests western civilisation and that western 
education is blasphemous. Literally, “Boko Haram” means ‘western education is a sin” or 
“forbidden”.  
Going by its alleged creation and sponsorship by a famous politician in Borno State in the 
early 2000s and its socio-religious outlook and agenda, Boko Haram is thus an Islamist 
insurgent group that arose from political, social and religious discontent within the Nigerian 
State (Adesoji, 2011:99-119). The recruits of the sect are mostly youths from the northern 
parts of Nigeria that are dissatisfied with the economic, political and social status quo. They 
include unemployed youth, stark illiterates, and refugees from neighbouring African 
countries. Thus, the sect explores the social-economic negativities of the country to recruit 
and radicalize its members (Nicoll, 2011:1-3).  
Eso (2011) observes that the push factor to recourse to terrorism in the bid to influence public 
policy is beyond sectarianism. He buttresses this by arguing that most of the attacks of the 
sect have been focussed at the state and its institutions, plus the civilian populations. It has 
launched attacks on military institutions such as military barracks, police stations (including 
the Force Headquarters in Abuja); and have also swooped on educational institutions at all 
levels, government establishments, places of worship (both churches and mosques) and have 
assassinated key political figures, statesmen and religious leaders that oppose their 
philosophy. The strategies have included kidnapping, targeted killing, assassination, suicide 
bombing, bombing with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), VBIEDS, ambush, and drive-
by shooting. 
In their own analysis, Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe (2013:46-60) aver that the attack 
launched on the United Nations Office in Abuja in 2011 gave the militant group a face 
similar to that of the Al-Qaeda’s. Locally, the sect is referred to as the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ due 
to the gravity and tenacity of it operations. More importantly is the strong link the group has 
with other transnational extremist groups, including Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda. Crucial 
aspects of their relations with other transnational militant groups include training, funding, 
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strategic knowledge on planning and tactical attacks and activities, ideological influence and 
human power resources (Ogbonnaya, Ufiem and Ehigiamusoe, 2013:46-60).  
While the Niger Delta militancy was a struggle for equity, that of Boko Haram’s has been a 
struggle for control of the state and superiority over the security forces. Ogbonnaya and 
Ehigiamusoe (2013:46-60) thus infer that what the two terrorist groups represent in terms of 
the global potential and feasibility for non-state actors as security challengers with destructive 
capabilities rivalling those of the state is alarming. The tenacity of events between 2011 and 
2014 reveals that the Nigerian State has not effectively equipped it security institutions with 
21st century equipment and that it has not given its military personnel the requisite training 
for the much needed capacity to defend the country from internal insurrections and external 
threats. Furthermore, the government has not lived up to its responsibility in handling these 
challenges and ensuring security. Militancy in the Niger Delta and the rise of Boko Haram 
have thus facilitated and aggravated the irony of sectional indifference. During the 
heightened militancy in the Niger Delta, the North did not care much about the fate of the 
victims and not until the increasing terror of the Boko Haram in Nigeria did the rest of the 
country began to be worried about the amount of terror in the Northern part.  
The mind-set of united Nigeria and the need for unity in diversity are usually lost in the face 
of terror and oppression of a group. This attitude of sectarianism, coupled with the weak and 
slow response of the Nigerian government ab intio, was what probably gave an impetus to the 
insurgency and its metamorphosis into a mainstream terrorist organization. The rest of 
Nigeria has however, come to realise that the terror group is indeed a threat to the security, 
sovereignty and stability of the Nigerian State and not just the North. Adibe (2012) captures 
the profundity of the challenge the Nigerian State faces when he argues that, the state 
is regarded as the enemy, not just by Boko Haram, but by several Nigerians and groups, each 
attacking it with as much ferocity as Boko Haram’s bombs, using whatever means they have 
at their disposal: politicians entrusted to protect our common patrimony steal the country 
blind, law enforcement officers see or hear no evil at a slight inducement, government 
workers drag their feet and refuse to give their best while revelling in moonlighting, organized 
labour, inducing university lecturers in public institutions go on indefinite strikes on a whim 
while journalists accept ‘brown envelops’ to turn truth on its head or become uncritical 
champions of a selected anti-Nigerian state identity. What all these groups have in common 
with Boko Haram is that they believe that the premise on which they act is justifiable and that 
the Nigerian state is unfair to them, if not an outright enemy (Cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa, 
2012:91-118). 
The implications of Boko Haram’s operation include the slowdown of the country’s 
economic growth and development, worsened unemployment, food scarcity due to the 
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inability of traders to transport food from the North to the South due to insecurity reasons, 
dented Nigeria’s public image, increased fear and a false sense of security, recourse to self-
help by people and citizens on most occasions such as the emergence of “Civilian JTF in 
Borno”, loss of life and damage to properties, and so forth (Alao, Atere and Alao, 2012:67-
87).  
In the bid to address the menace of terrorism, the Federal Government engaged development 
partners, including the United States (US), European Union (EU) and Israel, to step-up the 
war against terror. Nigeria also got proposals of assistance from Britain, Canada, China, 
France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN, to assist 
locate the over 234 abducted Chibok secondary school girls in Borno State. The US, France, 
Pakistan, and Britain have also offered to assist with counter-terrorism training (Ajayi, 
Igbintade, Ukpong and Otokpa, 2014). Also, the US Department of Defence has recently 
provided funds to Nigeria for the development of a counterterrorism infantry unit (US 
Embassy in Nigeria, 2014). 
Combating and Ending Insurgency/Terrorism in Nigeria   
The regularity and enormity of the terror unleashed by insurgents in various parts of the 
country make it expedient for strategies and solutions to the phenomena. First, there is the 
need to tow the path of countries in the industrialized world, particularly those who have 
gathered enough experience in the course of the fight against international terrorism, by 
building a potent Intelligence Gathering Infrastructure. In 2012, Nigeria had publicized plans 
for a new intelligence gathering centre that would be saddled with the responsibility of 
coordinating, improving and integrating intelligence gathering and sharing across security 
agencies and other aspects of government. Although this, if it eventually comes to fruition, 
will be helpful in curbing crime, but it has to be pursued side by side with sustainable 
infrastructure such as ICT and efficient power supply to back it. Lack of commitment, wrong 
prioritization of public policy and corruption may have slowed down the implementation of 
this promising plan. These have remained the major obstacles to the fight against terrorism 
and insurgency in Nigeria. However, Nigeria should endeavor to intensify its intelligence 
gathering technology.  
Moreover, all insurgents and terrorists caught or who surrendered must be fully prosecuted 
and adequately punished, as a situation in which justice does not prevail and offenders are 
freed on ground of amnesty or pardon will send the wrong signals to the society; these could 
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even encourage more acts of terrorism or motivate more insurgent groups to emerge and 
strike at the state. The reason it has taking so long to break Boko Haram, is not only because 
of the known sponsors who are sometimes shielded and walking free; it is also because many 
detained Boko Haram fighters and commanders disappear from detention reportedly, by the 
aid of collaborators in government and the military. Such commanders return to the terrorist 
camps to fortify and lead their cells in the sustained fight against the state. 
Training complements modern equipment. Once the intelligence infrastructure and military 
hardware are provided, training of military personnel in their effective and civilized or 
disciplined use is also required. Media reports have shown how low the morale of the troops 
has been in regard to the inferior weapons and poor training they go through. These have 
caused poor motivation and weak response up to the point of flight in the face of superior 
threat from the Boko Haram fighters (Folarin, 2014).  In line with the above, the armed forces 
should be empowered and trained with the ability for swift response to attacks. There have 
been incidents of the armed forces not coming to the aid of the victims during assaults by 
militants. A vivid instance was when students of the Federal Government College in Buni-
Yadi in Yobe State were killed in an operation that lasted for four hours and no security 
forces came to their rescue.   
Selection into the security organizations should be entirely based on merit, mental and 
emotional strength of the individual applicants, and physical stability or strength, giving the 
vital role the armed forces play in securing the country from both external and internal 
hostility and threats. Due to the delicate nature of the armed forces, it is recommended that 
only proficient, zealous, enthusiastic, patriotic and dedicated applicants should be enlisted. 
According to Akande (2014), the insurgents have higher morale than the Nigerian troops 
because they are more organized and have more sophisticated weapons. One of the basic 
factors for high morale is moral and financial inventive. A situation in which soldiers are 
placed on half salary, are tried in a General Court Martial for every act and are allegedly 
buried in mass graves or the superiors give them wrong orders that end up in disastrous 
offensives that lead to their ambush, as have been widely reported in the ongoing war on 
terror in Nigeria, will kill the spirit of the armed forces and culminate in strings of losses. The 
welfare of military personnel should be considered so that they can be dedicated to their job 
and not be vulnerable to corrupt practises.  
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The Nigerian government should wake up to its socio-economic responsibilities. Nigeria is 
ravaged by underdevelopment, unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, lack of basic social 
amenities, corruption, increased cost of living, etcetera, all of which have instigated 
grievances against the system and created breeding ground for terrorism. If these issues are 
squarely addressed, there is the possibility that terrorism will not be attractive to the future 
generation. If it has performed socio-economic responsibilities, the government should 
embark on social welfare programmes and education, like the Almajiri education policy in the 
North, to de-radicalize the youth and counter their violent extremist ideology. Therefore, if 
Nigeria treads the path of industrialization as Malaysia, India and China and the wealth is 
gets to the different sections and strata of society and citizens, grievances against the system 
will likely reduce. 
Tightening the security at the borders is quiet essential. Protecting the borders by ensuring a 
close monitoring of inflow and outflow of people will reduce the possibility of influx of 
foreigners with sinister motives. This will also help cut off of source of terrorists’ supply of 
arms, as such weapons in the hands of terrorists are transported through the borders with 
neighboring countries.  
Also, the government at all levels needs to be more prudent in its management of information 
on terrorist groups and security matters. For instance, the government in the media 
announced that the location where the abducted Chibok girls were kept was known without 
first strategizing on how to rescue the girls and rescuing them. The leakage of the information 
did not do Nigeria any good because the girls were relocated by the terrorists and since then 
have not been rescued, until a recent publicized truce between government and Boko Haram 
negotiators and promise by the latter to release the girls in exchange for Boko Haram 
prisoners. The discretion in the management of information will thus help in tackling 
insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. 
  
Conclusion 
From the numerous cases of terrorist attacks in Nigeria, it is obvious that insecurity beclouds 
the Nigerian State. The principle and myth of the state’s monopoly of the use of force have 
been shattered by the by desperate terrorist and insurgent groups pursuing parallel goals to 
that of the state. While the capability of the Boko Haram group was limited to shootings and 
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improvised explosives, the government did not realise the need to create order. Fortunately 
the intensification of terrorist attacks, the frequency of the attacks, the collateral damage to 
the country and the expanded scope of the activities of insurgents and terrorists have forced 
the government to understand the dilapidated state of security in Nigeria and the urgency in 
recent times, to restore order before Nigeria becomes a failed state.  
Also, while insurgency and terrorism have been interchangeably used both in this paper and 
in the discourse of the security threats in Nigeria generally; it is pertinent to state that 
insurgency is struggle for self-determination, which is a more legal and acceptable kind of 
struggle in a sovereign state, while terrorism is unconventional, vicious, endless because 
there are no rooms for negotiations and no arrowheads to spearhead dialogue, with the sole 
intent to cause collateral damage to the sovereign state. Hence, if the Niger Delta militancy 
was a form of insurgency; Boko Haram insurgency in 2009 when its leaders and cells were 
known, transited to a terrorist campaign after the death of its linchpin, Muhammed Yusuf and 
when it started faceless attacks and advertised vacuous, incomprehensible as well as 
impossible demands on the Nigerian State.   
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